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Full Idea
Perhaps science doesn't need a robust conception of causation, and can get by with thinking of causal laws in a Humean way, as the simplest generalization over the mosaic.
Gist of Idea
Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns
Source
John Hawthorne (Causal Structuralism [2001], 1.5)
Book Ref
Hawthorne,John: 'Metaphysical Essays' [OUP 2002], p.219
A Reaction
The Humean view he is referring to is held by David Lewis. That seems a council of defeat. We observe from a distance, but make no attempt to explain.
| 15123 | Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne] |
| 15122 | Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne] |
| 15121 | An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne] |
| 15124 | If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne] |
| 15126 | Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne] |
| 15127 | A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne] |
| 15128 | We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne] |
| 15125 | We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne] |